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Abstract  Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry 
inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance 
metric other than profit.  We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its 
ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility constraints from the 
perspective of strategic management.   
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1. Introduction 
 
If all other players in a strategic interaction are payoff-maximizers, a player can 
increase its payoff by committing to maximize something other than its payoff.  This 
paradoxical proposition was proved for a broad class of games by Heifetz et. al. in their 
provocatively titled paper “What to maximize if you must?” (2007)  The proposition 
implies that, if profit-seeking players are allowed to choose what to maximize, they 
generally will not choose to maximize profit.  This finding brings into question the 
validity of many applications of game theory which neglect to consider the possibility 
that players may commit to pursue something other than the payoffs.  In the context of 
strategic management, this implies that we cannot presume on a priori grounds that 
firms in an oligopolistic industry explicitly and directly pursue profits.  Rather, we 
should expect firms in an oligopoly to commit to pursue revenue, market share, or some 
other performance metric.  We should also expect such firms to exert effort to make 
their commitments credible and observable. 
The argument for why firms in an oligopoly have incentive to commit to 
maximize something other than profit has been reviewed by Fershtman and Judd (1987), 
who also analyzed the ramifications using a model of Cournot duopoly.  Since then, 
strategic deviations from profit maximization have been studied in the context of 
Cournot oligopoly by Blinder (1993), Dufwenberg and Guth (1999), Gehrig et. al. 
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(2004), Miller and Pazgal (2002) and others.  The goal of this paper is to simplify the 
earlier findings to the bare essentials, clarify the key issues, and qualify the argument by 
considering feasibility constraints from a management perspective.   
In the next section we will informally review why small-numbers competition 
among profit-seeking firms inherently generates incentives for them to commit to 
pursue an objective other than profit.  Section 3 will apply the theory to a Cournot 
duopoly with constant unit costs, the simplest context that exposes the key issues.  We 
will then narrow the focus by introducing feasibility constraints in Section 4 and further 
discuss feasibility from the management perspective in the concluding Section 5. 
 
 
2. Why maximize something other than profit 
 
A credible commitment by a player in a strategic interaction can influence the 
behavior of another player in a way that benefits the first player.  A firm that builds a 
large and efficient factory makes a commitment to manufacture more products at a 
lower cost, and this may induce a competing firm to cancel plans to build a large factory 
of its own, resigning to a smaller share of the market, or perhaps even exit the market.  
A much less tangible and often overlooked form of commitment is the adoption of a 
management philosophy to pursue some performance metric other than profit, for 
example, revenue or market share.  Just like building a factory, a commitment to a 
management philosophy can also influence the behavior of rivals in a way that benefits 
the firm that makes the commitment.  In equilibrium, all firms may commit to 
management philosophies and the resulting effect on profits may be positive or 
negative. 
A number of general treatments have examined endogenous strategic choice of 
objective function.  The conclusions are broad, general, and have support in 
evolutionary theory.  Heifetz, et. al. (2007) formally demonstrated that players in a 
generic game have incentive to commit to maximize something other than the payoffs 
of the game. Moreover, they showed that such commitments do not disappear under 
evolutionary dynamics.  Evolution of preferences theory too has shown that agents 
who maximize a “subjective utility” different from actual payoffs can evolve and 
displace agents who maximize actual payoffs (Guth and Kliemt, 1998).  Winter et. al. 
(2009) corroborated these findings in their analysis of “mental equilibria.”  A critical 
assumption underlying all these results is that players’ commitments are credible and 
can be observed by other players with enough precision.  We will return to the issue of 
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commitment in later sections. 
These results imply that there are no a priori grounds for presuming that 
optimizing entities engaged in strategic interactions do best by pursuing payoffs as 
directly and objectively as possible.  On the contrary, the results suggest we should 
expect optimizing entities in strategic interactions to maximize something other than 
what they ultimately seek, and, moreover, strive to credibly communicate their 
commitment to maximize that something else.   
 
 
3. Commitment to a performance metric in Cournot duopoly 
 
 Consider a Cournot duopoly facing linear demand p = a – q1 – q2, where p is 
the market-clearing price, a > 0 is a demand parameter, and qi is the quantity of output 
produced by firm }2,1{i .  Firms have constant unit costs ci.  We assume 
210 cc  and 122 cca  , which ensures that both firms produce positive quantities 
in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.  Each firm may adopt a “management philosophy” 
that observably and credibly commits it to maximize a specific performance metric.  
All quantity produced by the duopoly is sold at the market-clearing price, giving firms 
revenue ijii qqqaR )(   and profit iijii qcqqa )(  . All of the above is 
common knowledge. 
We will study equilibrium choice of management philosophies and their effects 
on profitability using the following two-stage model.  In Stage I, firms simultaneously, 
publicly, and credibly commit to a management philosophy.  Specifically, firm i 
commits that in Stage II it will maximize a “performance function” ),,,,( accqq ji
E
jii , 
where Ejq is the conjecture by firm i about the quantity to be produced by firm j.  
Stage II is standard Cournot competition except that each firm seeks to maximize its 
chosen performance function rather than profit.  That is, in Stage II firms 
simultaneously choose quantities qi per 
),,,,(maxarg* accqqq ji
E
jiiqi i
  
and in equilibrium conjectures about rivals’ output are fulfilled: *i
E
i qq  . 
The baseline case is when both firms commit to simply maximize profit.  
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Thus, if both firms choose ii    in Stage I, standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
quantities and profits result in Stage II: 
 
Equilibrium A (Standard Cournot-Nash) 
)2(31
*
jii ccaq   
2
9
1* )2( jii cca   
  
Next suppose each firm may commit to estimate demand optimistically or 
pessimistically by a bias i .  That is, the performance function firms commit to 
maximize is: 
ii
E
jiii qcqqa )(    
Maximization of this performance function in Stage II by both firms gives the 
equilibrium quantities as a function of the biases: 
)22(),( 31
*
jijijii ccaq    
In Stage I each firm looks ahead to Stage II and chooses the bias that will give it the 
most profit, assuming the rival does the same: 
),(maxarg *** jiii qqi    
The biases chosen in equilibrium of Stage I are 
)23(51
*
jii cca   
and the resulting quantities and profits are: 
 
Equilibrium B 
)23(52
*
jii ccaq   
2
25
2* )23( jii cca   
  
Equilibrium B also results when firms commit to use optimistic or conservative 
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estimates of their costs.  Specifically, if each firm estimates its unit cost as iic  , 
then the performance function is again ii
E
jiii qcqqa )(    and therefore the 
equilibrium biases, quantities, and profits are also the same as above. 
Equilibrium B also results when firms commit to pursue both profit and output.  
Specifically, if each firm commits to maximize iiii q  , then the performance 
function again takes the form ii
E
jiii qcqqa )(    and therefore the 
equilibrium biases, quantities, and profits are the same as above.   
Equilibrium B also results when firms commit to pursue both profit and 
revenue.  Specifically, if each firm commits to maximize iiii R  , then the 
performance function takes the form 
ii
E
jiii qcqqa )))(1((    
Maximization of this performance function in Stage II by both firms gives the 
equilibrium quantities as a function of the biases: 




 2
*
11
2
3
1),( 
j
i
i
jii
ccaq  
Optimization in Stage I to maximize profit gives the equilibrium biases: 
ji
ji
i cca
cca
28
23*

  
It is straightforward to confirm that the resulting quantities and profits are the same as in 
Equilibrium B. 
As summarized in Table 1, several different management philosophies result in 
Equilibrium B.  In general, a sufficient condition for a management philosophy to 
result in Equilibrium B is for the performance function to have the form 
),,,,( ji
E
jiiiii ccaqqf  , where the function fi is such that the first-order condition 
iiiii qfq  //  can be expressed as ),,,(/ jiiii ccagq    for some 
well-behaved function g.  An example of a management philosophy which does not 
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meet this criterion is a performance function that incorporates concern for market share: 
)/( jiiiii qqq   .  This leads to an essentially different maximization problem 
whose equilibrium is much less tractable. 
 
 
 Table 1  Some management philosophies that result in Equilibrium B.  It is 
assumed that parameters are restricted to ranges that yield interior equilibria. 
 
Management 
philosophy 
Performance function Equilibrium bias 
Demand 
optimism or 
pessimism 
ii    with iaa   )23(51* jii cca   
Cost optimism 
or pessimism ii
   with iii cc        ’’ 
Concern for 
profit and 
quantity 
iiii q        ’’ 
Concern for 
profit and 
revenue 
iiii R   
ji
ji
i cca
cca
28
23*

  
 
 Comparing firms’ performance in Equilibrium A and Equilibrium B reveals that 
the adoption of management philosophies results in:  
 more output by the more efficient firm 1 
 more or less output by the less efficient firm 2 
 possibility of firm 2 shutting down 
 more industry output and lower market price  
 higher or lower profit for firm 1 
 lower or zero profit for firm 2 
 
Overall, management philosophies intensify competition and may even hurt the 
profit of the more efficient firm.  These conclusions do not critically depend on the 
assumption that the firms’ products are prefect substitutes.  An n-firm oligopoly model 
that allows for various degrees of strategic substitutability or complementarity reached 
qualitatively similar conclusions (Gehrig et. al., 2004)  In that model, each firm could 
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commit to use a biased estimate of the degree of substitutability or complementarity of 
its product vis-à-vis products sold in the same market by other firms.  In equilibrium, 
firms committed to over-estimate substitutability or under-estimate complementarity, 
leading them to compete more aggressively in the output market and earn lower profits. 
Our assumption of constant unit costs is also not critical to the overall 
conclusions.  In a Cournot duopoly where costs increase quadratically with output, 
Dufwenberg and Guth (1999) allowed firms to commit to maximize a linear 
combination of profit and output and found that in equilibrium firms do make such 
commitments and end up competing more aggressively, resulting in lower price, higher 
output, and lower profits.   
Lastly, our conclusions do not critically depend on the assumption of certainty 
about costs and demand.  Fershtman and Judd (1987) allowed firms to commit to 
maximize a linear combination of profit and revenue in a Cournot duopoly under 
conditions of cost and demand uncertainty.  In the equilibria of their model, firms 
commit to place some weight on revenue rather than just pursue profit and end up 
competing more aggressively, driving down both price and profits. 
 
 
4. Feasible commitments in Cournot duopoly: profit or revenue 
 
 We have been tacitly assuming that firms can fine-tune their management 
philosophies by choosing from a large space of performance functions parameterized by 
i .  Considering that firms must not only choose a performance function but also 
explain and commit to the corresponding management philosophy both internally and 
externally, and then actually implement it within the organization, the set of feasible 
performance functions is probably very limited.  In the context Cournot oligopoly, the 
two simplest and therefore most feasible performance functions are profit and revenue.  
Therefore, we will next restrict choice of management philosophies to either profit or 
revenue.  Specifically, we will study the following simplified version of two-stage 
game that we introduced in the previous section: 
 
 Stage I:  each firm simultaneously, publicly, and credibly chooses to commit 
to maximize either Profit or Revenue; i.e., each firm chooses performance function 
},{ iii R   
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 Stage II:  each firm simultaneously chooses a quantity that maximizes the 
performance metric it selected in Stage I, taking into account that its rival is also 
maximizing its chosen performance function 
  
If both firms choose Profit in stage I, the result is the standard Cournot-Nash 
Equilibrium A.  If both firms choose Revenue in stage I, it is straightforward to show 
that equilibrium quantities and profits in Stage II are  
 
    Equilibrium RR 
aq RRi 31  
)3(91 i
RR
i caa   
Note that since both firms ignore their costs when choosing quantities, each form 
chooses the same quantity.  Furthermore, the costs do not affect equilibrium quantities 
and only affect profits. 
 The last possibility in Stage I is for firm i to choose Revenue and firm j to 
choose Profit.  It is straightforward to show that in the resulting Stage II equilibrium 
quantities and profits are  
 
Equilibrium RP 
)(31 j
RP
i caq      )2(31 jRPj caq   
)3)((91 jij
RP
i ccaca   291 )2( jRPj ca   
 
Note that since firm i commits to ignore its cost when choosing quantity, ci does not 
affect either firm’s equilibrium quantity or firm j’s equilibrium profit.   
Profits earned in PP, RR, and RP equilibria comprise the payoff matrix of the 
Stage I game as shown in Table 2.  Each of the four outcomes can be a Nash 
equilibrium under some combination of cost and demand parameters.  Table 3 
summarizes conditions on cost and demand parameters that make each outcome a Nash 
equilibrium.  Figure 1 plots the corresponding regions in the space of all possible 
duopolies parameterized by firms’ costs (c1, c2). 
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Table 2  Payoff matrix of the game in which firms may choose to maximize either 
Revenue or Profit.  Firm 1’s profit appears above firm 2’s  profit in each cell.  To 
avoid fractions, all profits are scaled by a factor of 9. 
 
                              Firm 2 
  Profit Revenue 
 
 
 
Firm 1 
Profit 
2
21 )2( cca   
2
12 )2( cca   
2
1)2( ca   
)3)(( 121 ccaca 
 
Revenue
)3)(( 212 ccaca 
2
2 )2( ca   
)3( 1caa   
)3( 2caa   
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Correspondence between duopoly parameters and 
management philosophies chosen in equilibrium 
 
 
Cost and demand parameters 
Performance function chosen 
in equilibrium 
Firm 1 Firm 2 
}4)(|),{( 1214121 acccacc    Profit Profit 
}|),{( 41241121 acandaccc   Revenue Revenue 
)},4max(|),{( 411221 aacccc   Revenue Profit 
)}(|),{( 141241121 cacandaccc  Profit Revenue 
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Figure 1  Triangle XYZ is the space of all duopolies such that 12 cc  and 0*2 q when both 
firms maximize profit.  Equilibrium management philosophies are denoted by PP (profit 
maximization by both firms, region AZC), RR (revenue maximization by both firms, region 
XFB), RP (revenue-maximization by firm 1, profit-maximization by firm 2, region FYACB), 
and PR (profit-maximization by firm 1, revenue-maximization by firm 2, region BDC). 
 
 
Examining the above results leads to the following conclusions about how the 
possibility of commitment to pursue revenue instead of profits affects firms’ 
performance: 
 
1. Both firms maximize profit (region AZC in Figure 1):  When both firms’ costs 
are high, neither firm makes use of the revenue-maximizing management 
philosophy.  Standard Cournot Equilibrium A obtains. 
 
2. Both firms maximize revenue (region XFB in Figure 1):  When both firms’ 
costs are low, both firms commit to act as if unit costs were zero and maximize 
revenue.  Compared to standard Cournot equilibrium A, in equilibrium RR firm 
1 and industry as a whole earn less profit.  Firm 2’s profit is also lower except 
for a limited set of duopolies satisfying })2()2(|),{( 2121221 ccccacc  .  
D. Rtischev / Gakushuin Economic Papers, 49:2 (2012) 133-142 
 
 11
Thus, even though committing to maximize revenue intensifies competition 
relative to when firms maximize profit, it is possible for the less efficient firm to 
benefit.  This is because if both firms commit to maximize revenue, firm 2’s 
cost disadvantage becomes irrelevant for choosing quantity, and thus both firms 
end up on equal footing. 
 
3. Firm 1 maximizes revenue, firm 2 profit (region FYACB in Figure 1):  When 
firm 1 is much more efficient than firm 2, there is a Nash equilibrium in which 
firm 1 commits to maximize revenue while firm 2 maximizes profit.  Relative 
to Equilibrium A, in Equilibrium RP firm 1 earns more profit and firm 2 earns 
less.  Indeed, by adopting the revenue-maximization philosophy, firm 1 may 
cause firm 2 to shut down completely; this occurs if ac 212  , which 
corresponds to region YAE in Figure 1.  Industry profit is higher if 
15
1
2 cac  ; otherwise it is lower. 
 
4. Firm 1 maximizes profit, firm 2 revenue (region BDC in Figure 1):  For a small 
subset of parameter values for which [Revenue, Profit] is an equilibrium, the 
opposite configuration of philosophies also constitutes a Nash equilibrium.  A 
coordination problem appears in which each firm prefers to adopt a philosophy 
different from that of its rival.  Compared to Equilibrium A, in the [Profit, 
Revenue] equilibrium firm 2’s profits are higher whereas the profits of firm 1 
and the industry as a whole are lower.   
 
The [Revenue, Profit] equilibrium has also been studied by Blinder (1993), 
who was interested in analyzing competition between a revenue-maximizing firm and a 
profit-maximizing firm.  Blinder concluded that the revenue-maximizer has strategic 
advantage over the profit-maximizer.  However, in Blinder’s model firms have 
identical costs, one firm is exogenously assumed to maximize revenue, and the other 
profit.  Allowing for cost differences and endogenizing each firm’s decision whether to 
maximize profit or revenue, our model identifies parameter ranges within which 
Blinder’s conclusions are valid. 
 
 
 
D. Rtischev / Gakushuin Economic Papers, 49:2 (2012) 133-142 
 
 12
5. Discussion 
 
The business press regularly reports about companies pursuing revenue, market 
share, or some other performance metric, even to the point of sacrificing profit.  The 
theory we have reviewed suggests one explanation for why such pursuits makes 
strategic sense.  But because the theory hinges on the firms’ ability to make public and 
credible commitments to their chosen performance metrics, the explanation is 
incomplete without understanding how the firms make such commitments.  One 
possibility is that the commitments are rooted is the institutional environment within 
which firms operate.  For example, the law and norms governing firms’ relations with 
employees and shareholders are such that employee welfare enters the objective 
function of many Japanese firms to a greater extent than in the case of American firms 
(Aoki, 1988).  Starting with this observation, Blinder (1993) showed that a firm which 
includes employee welfare along with profit in its performance function essentially 
becomes a revenue-maximizing entity.  Similar to our findings in the RP equilibrium 
of Section 4, Blinder showed that such commitment to maximize revenue gives the 
prototypical Japanese firm a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the prototypical American 
firm.   
Other ways for a firm to commit to pursue something other than profit have 
been studied under the rubric of strategic delegation.  Strategic delegation models 
consider a principal (firm owner) who hires an agent (manager) to operate the firm.  In 
one strand of strategic delegation literature, the owner hires a wealth-maximizing 
manager under an incentive contract that compensates the manager according to some 
combination of performance metrics, including those that measure performance relative 
to competitors.  Taking this approach, Fershtman and Judd (1987) showed that 
“profit-maximizing owners will almost never tell their managers to maximize profits.”  
In another strand of the strategic delegation literature, the owner selects a manager with 
certain personality traits, such as compulsion to outdo competitors (Miller and Pazgal, 
2002) or undue optimism about research and development prospects (Englmaier, 2011).  
In both strands of strategic delegation literature, commitment to maximize something 
other than profit is rooted in the psychology of the manager, who is either rationally 
maximizing his private wealth per his incentive contract or irrationally pursuing goals 
as dictated by his overly rivalrous or unduly optimistic personality. 
The conclusion is that to earn maximum possible profit, a firm does not 
necessarily have to pursue maximum profit all the time at every level.  A firm which is 
not overtly pursuing the “bottom line” is not necessarily guilty of poor management, 
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neglect of shareholder interests, or anticompetitive machinations.  Rather, our 
theoretical review indicates that quite the opposite is true: strategic deviations from 
profit maximization are inherent to the logic of competition in oligopolistic industries.  
It is a task of strategic management to discover, commit to, promulgate, and maximize 
performance metrics which ultimately yield maximum possible profits, all while taking 
into account the performance metrics that rivals have committed to pursue.  The 
feasibility of a performance metric critically depends on the ability to credibly commit 
to use the metric and communicate about it.  Contractual, institutional, and 
psychological bases of commitment can be of use. 
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